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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 11-1488 
_____________ 
 
C. A. C., II, an infant, by his Guardian Ad Litem, C.C., father and P.C., mother; C. C., 
Individually; P. C., Individually, 
Appellants 
 
v. 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; UNITED STATES AIR FORCE; LT. COL. 
WILLIAM PALIWODA, individually and in his official capacity as Lt. Col. with the 
Unites States Air Force; JANE PALIWODA, a fictitious name; JOHN DOE I, a fictitious 
name; JOHN DOE II, a fictitious name; JOHN DOE III, a fictitious name; JOHN DOE 
IV, a fictitious name; JOHN DOE V, a fictitious name 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
(D.C. Civ. No. 09-06057) 
District Judge: Honorable Joel A. Pisano  
______________ 
 
Argued October 24, 2011 
______________ 
Before: SLOVITER, GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges,  
and POLLAK*
 
, Senior District Judge. 
(Opinion Filed:  November 4, 2011) 
______________ 
 
Cristina Vasillou Harvey (argued) 
Lomurro, Davison, Eastman and Munoz, P.A. 
Monmuth Executive Center 
                                              
* Hon. Louis H. Pollak, Senior Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.  
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100 Willow Brook Road, Suite 100 
Freehold, New Jersey 07728 
 Counsel for Appellants 
 
Paul J. Fishman, United States Attorney 
Tony West, Assistant Attorney General 
Thomas M. Bondy, Attorney, Appellate Staff 
Benjamin M. Shultz, Attorney, Appellate Staff (argued) 
U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division 
Room 7211  
950 Pennsylvania Ave. NW 
Washington, D.C. 20530 
 
Allan Urgent, United States Attorney 
Office of the United States Attorney 
970 Broad Street, Room 700 
Newark, NJ  07102 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
Appellant C.A.C. II (“C.A.C.”), a minor, together with his parents C.C. and P.C., 
(collectively, “Appellants”), brought suit against Lieutenant Colonel William J. 
Paliwoda, his wife, the United States Air Force (“the Air Force”), and the United States 
(“the Government”) seeking damages based on the claim that Paliwoda had sexually 
abused C.A.C.  Their complaint alleges that Paliwoda had previously abused other 
children and that the Air Force, knowing about the wrongful conduct, transferred 
Paliwoda to New Jersey, where C.A.C. resides.  The United States moved to dismiss for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), asserting that sovereign 
immunity barred the suit as to the federal government.  The District Court found that the 
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waiver of sovereign immunity contained in the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 
U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1), did not apply here, and therefore granted the Government’s motion 
to dismiss.  Appellants timely appealed and now seek our review of the District Court’s 
decision.  
 Because Appellants failed to raise before the District Court the New Jersey statute 
upon which this appeal is based, the argument is now waived.  We will affirm the order 
of the District Court. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
 Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we recount only the 
essential facts. 
While employed by the Air Force and stationed in Virginia and Arkansas, 
Paliwoda sexually abused and inappropriately touched children on several occasions, 
over a period of approximately fifteen years.  This inappropriate touching consisted 
largely of sucking on and biting several boys’ toes for sexual gratification and on at least 
one occasion touching a boy’s testicles.  Appellants allege that the Government was 
aware of this behavior, as were individual Government employees John Does 1-5.  
Despite its knowledge of his inappropriate touching, the Government transferred 
Paliwoda to McGuire Air Force Base in New Jersey.  There, Paliwoda resided off base in 
a private home in New Egypt, New Jersey.  The Air Force did not select or locate this 
residence for him.  
C.A.C. lived across the street from Paliwoda’s new home.  Appellants allege that 
on multiple occasions, Paliwoda inappropriately touched C.A.C., leaving C.A.C. with 
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psychological injuries that required medical treatment.  At Paliwoda’s court martial, 
C.A.C. testified that Paliwoda had sucked and nibbled on his toes.   
Appellants filed their complaint in the District Court, seeking damages from 
Paliwoda, his wife (fictitiously identified as “Jane Paliwoda”), the Air Force, and the 
Government.  The Government and the Air Force filed a motion to dismiss, pursuant to 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), with two declarations.  The first declaration, from Lt. Col. 
Bradford T. Johnson, detailed Paliwoda’s job responsibilities at his McGuire Air Force 
Base Post.  The second, from Lt. Col. Mark D. Pollard, stated that Paliwoda’s New Jersey 
home was a private residence, which the Air Force had not secured for Paliwoda, and that 
Paliwoda had not been on duty at the time the incident in question occurred.   
The District Court granted the motion to dismiss.  The Court dismissed the Air 
Force, finding that the general waiver of sovereign immunity in the FTCA is inapplicable 
to claims against federal agencies and that the Air Force had not explicitly waived 
sovereign immunity in any other fashion.  Regarding the Government’s liability, the 
District Court first noted that Appellants did not contend that the Government was liable 
for Paliwoda’s conduct and thus considered only the Government’s own negligence.  It 
found that the decision to investigate or discipline Paliwoda for his earlier actions was 
discretionary and therefore excluded from the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity by 
the discretionary function exception, codified at 28 U.S.C § 2680.   
Appellants also claimed that the Government had negligently reassigned Paliwoda 
to a new base.  The District Court held that this claim fell within the intentional torts 
exception to the FTCA because it was inextricably intertwined with Paliwoda’s status as 
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an employee of the Government.  There was also no duty under New Jersey law that the 
Government owed Appellants that existed independent of Paliwoda’s employment status.  
As such, there was no subject matter jurisdiction as to the Government.   
The District Court subsequently declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 
over the state law claims against Paliwoda and his wife.  
II.  JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
If the District Court did have subject matter jurisdiction over this case, an issue 
that lies at the heart of this appeal, that jurisdiction would have stemmed from the waiver 
of sovereign immunity contained in the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. §1346(b)(1).  We have 
jurisdiction over an appeal of the District Court’s order dismissing a complaint for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 
458 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2006).  We exercise plenary review over such an order.  Id.   
III.  ANALYSIS 
Appellants must overcome any specter of waiver before consideration of the 
merits here.  Appellants contend that the Government breached a duty to Appellants 
created by New Jersey statute, N.J. Stat. Ann. 9:6-8.10 (“the Child Abuse Reporting 
Statute” or “the Statute”).  The Statute requires every person with reasonable cause to 
believe that child abuse has occurred to report the abuse to the Department of Youth and 
Family Services (“DYFS”).  In Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392 (1988), the 
Supreme Court held that the FTCA waives sovereign immunity where the Government is 
liable under state law for an assault committed by a Government employee on a basis 
“entirely independent of [the assailant’s] employment status.”  Id. at 401; see also Matsko 
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v. United States, 372 F.3d 556, 561 & n.10 (3d Cir. 2004).  Appellants argue that the 
District Court had subject matter jurisdiction based on the Government’s breach of the 
duty imposed by the Child Abuse Reporting Statute, which exists independent of the 
employment relationship between the Government and Paliwoda. 
However, Appellants never argued or mentioned the applicability of the Child 
Abuse Reporting Statute before the District Court.1
Appellants failed to mention the Statute in their pleadings or briefs below.  The 
complaint does, however, allege that the Government “failed to take any action or 
otherwise to protect the infant Plaintiff, CAC, II., from the foreseeable injuries caused by 
Defendant [Lt.] Col. Paliwoda.”  (App. at 21.)  This general mention of a failure to 
protect in no way presented to the District Court the argument that the Government had 
  “This court has consistently held that 
it will not consider issues that are raised for the first time on appeal.”  Harris v. City of 
Philadelphia, 35 F.3d 840, 845 (3d Cir. 1994).  For an issue to be preserved for appeal, 
“a party ‘must unequivocally put its position before the trial court at a point and in a 
manner that permits the court to consider its merits.’”  In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust 
Litigation, 579 F.3d 241, 262 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Shell Petroleum, Inc. v. United 
States, 182 F.3d 212, 218 (3d Cir. 1999)).  “A fleeting reference or vague allusion to an 
issue will not suffice to preserve it for appeal, so ‘the crucial question regarding waiver is 
whether defendants presented the argument with sufficient specificity to alert the district 
court.’”  Id. (quoting Keenan v. City of Phila., 983 F.2d 459, 471 (3d Cir. 1992)). 
                                              
1 Counsel for Appellants conceded this point at oral argument. 
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breached its duty under the Statute “‘in a manner that permit[ted] the court to consider its 
merits.’”  Shell Petroleum, Inc., 182 F.3d at 218.  Accordingly, Appellants have waived 
the only argument that they present on appeal. 
Appellants urge us to exercise our discretionary power to consider “a pure 
question of law even if not raised below where refusal to reach the issue would result in a 
miscarriage of justice or where the issue’s resolution is of public importance.”  
Loretangeli v. Critelli, 853 F.2d 186, 189-90 n.5 (3d Cir. 1988).  We exercise this 
discretion “only when manifest injustice would result from a failure to consider novel 
issues,” a category of cases which we have labeled “extraordinary.”  Pritzker v. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110, 1115 (3d Cir. 1993).  Where litigants 
will have an opportunity to seek a remedy in another forum, as Appellants here will be 
free to do in the New Jersey courts, no such extraordinary circumstances are presented.2
We decline to exercise our discretion to consider Appellants’ waived argument.   
  
See id.   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the order of the District Court.  
 
                                              
2 The waiver rule “applies with added force where the timely raising of the issue would 
have permitted the parties to develop a factual record.”  Matter of American Biomaterials 
Corp., 954 F.2d 919, 927-28 (3d Cir. 1992).  Here, the New Jersey case upon which 
Appellants’ argument hinges engages in a highly fact-bound inquiry to determine 
whether a duty to report abuse exists, J.S. v. R.T.H., 714 A.2d 924 (N.J. 1998), thereby 
compounding our reluctance to pass upon an issue raised for the first time in this Court.  
